were due to ''pure'' equipment failure according to pre-defined criteria. Of these 107 (60%) involved anaesthetic equipment, 42 (24%) involved monitors, 17 (10%) other theatre equipment and 11 (6%) the gas or electricity supply. Ninety-seven (55% of the 177) were potentially life-threatening; of these two-thirds would be detected by the array of monitors recommended by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and all but 9 of the remainder would be handled by application of the crisis management algorithm recommended elsewhere in this symposium. Of the 9 remaining, 2 were electrical shock, 3 overheating of a humidifier or blood warmer, 2 the unavailability of a spare laryngoscope and 1 the consequence of a power failure. Meticulous adherence to the equipment checking and monitoring guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and application of a suitable crisis management algorithm should protect the patient from potentially life-threatening equipment failure in virtually all cases except electric shock, power failure and overheating of warming devices.
1. The equipment failed to perform in the manner specified by the manufacturer. 2. It had been adequately maintained and was being used in an acceptable way. 3 . It had been checked prior to use or was the sort of equipment which is not usually or cannot be subjected to a specific pre-use check. Problems which occurred as a result of poor design, disconnections, leaks or misconnections at connectors or the improper use of or inexperience with equipment will not be considered here.
It was decided to identify and categorize all the incidents involving "true" equipment failure (as defined by the above criteria) among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) in order to try to identify strategies to prevent them from occurring and to minimize their impact.
METHODS
The first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were individually analysed by reading the narrative; those due to equipment failure that met the criteria given above were extracted for further analysis. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which did reduce, or could have reduced, the safety margin for the patient. Details of the AIMS methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium. I "Equipment" was defined to include the gas and electricity supply, drug delivery systems, the anaesthesia machine and its ancillary equipment, the patient breathing systems and all monitors and other equipment that come into contact with or may directly affect the patient. Incidents that concerned disconnects, leaks or misconnects at connectors were not analysed in detail for this paper as they are the subject of a separate paper in this symposium.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The 177 incidents of equipment failure (as defined by the criteria given above) are categorized in Table 1 , and ranked by their frequency of occurrence.
Anaesthetic Equipment (107 cases)
Unidirectional Valves (46 cases). Failure of a unidirectional valve in the circle system was the most common problem; 46 of the 59 reported overall' were due to failure of the valve (e.g., sticking) rather than to misassembly or failure to detect a deformed valve or cage at the start. If a calibrated capnograph is always to be used then it could be argued that this high rate of failure is acceptable. However, if one is not, then this design quite clearly is inadequate, especially as the valves become more likely to stick with increased condensation and low fresh gas flows. It was considered that valve failure would cause a life-threatening problem in only 4 cases.
Ventilation (32 cases). On 14 occasions oxygen was entrained due to a leak in the system; this was usually in the bellows of a Campbell ventilator. On three further occasions ambient gas was entrained due to valve failure. These problems were not considered lifethreatening. They would have been detected by the correct use of an oxygen analyser.
On 6 occasions a ventilator ceased cycling during the case; several brands of ventilator were involved. These were considered life-threatening problems that would, however, have been detected by the correct use of low pressure and apnoea alarms. On 3 occasions ventilators failed to develop adequate inflation pressures, and on 3 occasions developed excessive pressure due to valve problems.
The 3 remaining problems involved a Bird ventilator spontaneously developing negative-end-expiratory pressure; outlet obstruction in a Campbell ventilator; and a seized-up tidal volume control knob in a Bear ventilator. In all, only 13 of the 32 ventilator failures were considered life-threatening; it was considered that they would have been detected by appropriate monitoring in 29 of these cases (see Table 1 ). These incidents emphasize the desirability of "disconnect" and "apnoea" alarms as well as of instantaneously activated high-pressure circuit alarms.
Circuit Integrity (5 cases). On one occasion a spill valve jammed open (precluding ventilation), on one a "Y'~connector disintegrated, on one a fresh gas h This includes those incidents that would be detected with monitors as well as those incidents which are "obvious" (e.g. a wheel coming off a trolley). This assumes the use of appropriate monitors. These include an oxygen supply failure alarm, highand low-pressure circuit alarms, oxygen analyzer, oximeter, capnograph and an appropriate blood pressure monitor. , This "residuum represents the number of life-threatening incidents not amendable to monitor detection that would be "corrected" from the perspective of patient safety by the correct application of the crisis management algorithm described elsewhere in this symposium. ' J Carbon dioxide absorber.
Includes low-pressure alarms in the circuit and those built into the ventilator.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 connection to a T-piece fractured, on one a soda lime canister bracket broke causing the canister to fall off and disintegrate, and on one a soda lime absorber obstructed the fresh gas line after being moved (it could not be moved back because of a "ratchet" effect). All were considered potentially life-threatening but detectable with appropriate monitoring. Anaesthetic Machine (4 cases). On 2 occasions wheels fell off anaesthetic machines while they were being moved, on one, faulty rotameter tube seals delivered a hypoxic mixture and on one, an oxygen rotameter needle valve fractured, resulting in low oxygen flow. The latter two were both deemed potentially life-threatening, but detectable with appropriate monitoring. 3 Vaporizer (4 cases). On 2 occasions there were leaks at "Selectatec" fittings, on one a vaporizer rotary concentration dial was found to be spinning freely and on one a vaporizer was still delivering vapour when turned off. In the absence of volatile anaesthetic gas monitors, good crisis management is necessary to detect and correct these problems. 4 Carbon dioxide absorber (4 cases). On two occasions faulty new absorbers were supplied by the manufacturer; no gas would flow through the soda lime. In a further incident the soda lime became exhausted in the central position of the absorber, but this was not visible. In the last incident in this set a patient breathing circuit developed positive-endexpiratory pressure because of compacted soda lime in the central tube in the absorber.
Endotracheal tube (4 cases). On 3 occasions cuffs ruptured during the case (one in a recycled armoured tube) and on one a faulty cuff became uneven during the case, resulting in one-lung ventilation.
Gas Regulator (3 cases). On one occasion an incorrectly adjusted oxygen regulator valve did not allow oxygen to flow from a full cylinder to the anaesthetic machine, on one a nitrous oxide regulator failed one hour into a case, giving widely fluctuating nitrous oxide concentrations. In a further incident a nitrous oxide regulator did the same thing after being serviced; on this occasion it still delivered nitrous oxide even when turned "off". The surprising prevalence of "wrong" gas mixtures due to other causes is documented elsewhere in this symposium, supporting the need again emphasized here for the routine correct use of an oxygen analyser. 3
Laryngoscope (2 cases). On 2 occasions laryngoscopes malfunctioned when no replacements were available; there should always be at least one checked, functioning spare immediately available, with 2 more on an emergency trolley.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, Ocrober, 1993 Self-inflating Bag (2 cases). On one occasion the assembly fell apart and on one the valve was misassembled; the latter incident led to the death of a patient. A self-inflating bag should be available on every anaesthetic machine; 4 however, it is vital that it be checked, with the anaesthetic machine, at the start of the day.
Pressure Relief Valve (1 case). Failure of a pressure relief valve led to over-pressurization of the patient circuit, again emphasizing the need for an instantly activated high-pressure alarm in the breathing circuit.
Monitors (42 cases). Many cases of "failure" were reported in which the monitors in question were actually performing to specification or because of unreasonable expectations on the part of the reporter (e.g., an oximeter failing to alarm with 19070 inspired oxygen), incorrect use or failure to check. 2 . 6 Only cases likely to be "true" equipment failure have been included for consideration here.
Blood pressure monitors (11 cases). There was no case of invasive blood pressure monitor failure during use other than due to incorrect use or power failure. There were 10 cases of failure to record the blood pressure or of misleading readings with automated noninvasive devices; these were associated with some morbidity and at least one death. 7 There is little to commend them over the use of "manual" sphygmomanometers other than operator convenience, although there was one case of failure of a sphygmomanometer. These problems would not be detected early unless blood pressure was measured by another means.
Oxygen analyser (8 cases). Four incidents involved faulty readings during the case, 3 involved circuit leaks and in one total circuit obstruction was caused by the disintegration of the sensor.3 It was considered that the leaks would have been detected by appropriate monitoring before patient harm would occur.
Pulse oximeter (7 cases). There were 3 cases of probe failure, 2 of over-reading, one of under-reading, and on one occasion the alarm failed in a brand-new device. 5 It is fortunate that this latter mode of failure seems to be rare as there is no ready means of checking the "low" alarm.
Capnograph (6 cases). There were 6 reports of failure of the apnoea alarm. 2 It is suspected that in some of these the alarm may have been disabled by another user and that the reporter had not checked the alarm before use. Nevertheless, these have been included here as cases of equipment failure. In one case a capnograph caused a problem when it defaulted to "calibration mode" after a power failure; this was not considered to constitute equipment failure as the device was designed to do this when "powered up".
Electrocardiograph (2 cases). On 2 occasions the ECG display screen went blank during a case.
Low pressure alarm failure (7 cases) . Three lowpressure circuit alarms failed and 3 low-pressure alarms situated in the ventilator also did so when the patient was apnoeic. This emphasises the need for a "beIt-andbraces" approach to monitoring the ventilation of a paralysed patient, with the use of pulse oximetry as a "back-up" in case both "front-line" ventilation monitors fail. 2, 5 One low-pressure device alarmed spuriously when all was well.
Spirometer (1 case) . A spirometer vane became wet and then under-read by 50070 (320 ml tidal volume vs 600 ml).
Theatre Equipment (17 cases)
Humidifier (4 cases). In one case the heating hose melted a fresh gas line; in one the airway temperature rose to 47°C without an alarm or cut-out operating, in one "high airway resistance" was located at an obstructed heat and moisture exchanger just before theophylline was given to the patient, and in one the humidifier would not warm up due to a wiring problem. An "overheating" problem would not be detected by conventional monitoring and crisis management would be too late once systemic signs developed.
Infusion pump (4 cases). Two pumps (both "Injectomats") failed during a procedure; one failure resulted in a rise in blood pressure due to failure of delivery of a vasodilator. In other incidents, a pump malfunctioned and delivered five times the desired amount of vasodilator and a pump delivered 85 mg of atracurium during pre-oxygenation, leading to respiratory difficulty. Great vigilance and a high index of suspicion is needed to detect, diagnose and locate these problems. Regularly marking and charting the travel of a syringe plunger or the amount in a burette are both good practices.
Theatre table or trolley (4 cases). On two occasions the head of the theatre table collapsed -on one occasion due to a missing screw (found on the floor before the case) and the other to a faulty ratchet mechanism. In one case the wheel of a trolley collapsed and an infant fell to the floor, and in another hypoxia was prolonged in transit because of a "stiff" wheel impeding progress.
Blood warmer (2 cases). In one case the bath temperature had risen to 48°C ten minutes after use had started, and in one, after noticing that the water reservoir felt hot, it was discovered that the water temperature was 53 °C and that the blood in the coil had coagulated (thus saving the patient). Again, an "overheating" problem would not be detected by conventional monitoring and crisis management would be too late once systemic signs developed.
Intravenous flask (1 case). The single case reported involved Haemaccelleaking from the side of the cap of the flask.
Tourniquet Failure (1 case) . The single case reported involved failure of the tourniquet 10 minutes after an intravenous block.
Image intensifier (1 case). -The image intensifier failed, which resulted in the procedure being cancelled for a patient who had already been anaesthetized.
Services (11 cases)
Gas Supply (6 cases). In one case a fresh gas line was severed by opening a drawer, in one by running over it with another machine, and in one case the hose "blew off". In one the supply of medical air failed because of compressor failure due to an electrical storm, in one the air and oxygen pipelines were "switched" by maintenance engineers working over a weekend, and in one oxygen delivery from a cylinder failed due to a faulty seal on a bayonet fitting. The importance of using oxygen supply failure alarms and oxygen analysers has already been emphasized. 3 Electricity supply (5 cases). On 2 occasions anaesthetists received "shocks" due to faulty wiring and on 3 the power failed. Two of the latter involved failure of power to monitors and one a total blackout while a patient was in transit to the recovery ward; on this occasion it took 45 seconds for the emergency power to come on. In spite of the measures in place for the supply of emergency power it may be prudent to keep a supply of battery-operated torches in areas in which patients are anaesthetized or are recovering.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, 177 (9070) of the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were due to "pure" equipment failure. Of these 97 (55070) were potentially lifethreatening, and 125 (70070) would be expected to be detected using the array of monitors suggested by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (including both capnography and a low-pressure alarm for ventilated patients) (see Table 1 ). Sixty-two of the 97 life-threatening incidents were monitor detectable.
Of the residuum of 35 incidents which were potentially life-threatening, but which would not be detected by conventional monitoring, 26 would be "diagnosed" and "corrected" (from the perspective of patient safety) by application of the crisis management algorithm presented elsewhere in this symposium. 4 The figure of 26 is based qn a presumption that an anaesthetist would never act on a read-out from an automated blood pressure monitor without an independent check of the blood pressure, and that hypotension would be picked up by other means in the event of a false "normotensive" reading. In the event of being alerted "late", the crisis management algorithm would at least represent the best course of action.
Of the remaining 9 cases 2 were electric shocks, 1 was the consequence of power or light source failure, 2 the unavailability of a spare laryngoscope and 3 were overheating humidifiers or blood warmers. Although these devices are fitted with both electronic and thermo-mechanical "cut-outs", it seems that the latter may seize up with disuse; regular testing of these would seem to be indicated.
In order to protect patients and staff from equipment failure, regular checking of current-leakage protection devices and preventative maintenance of equipment is necessary; also a full check should be carried out of all equipment to be used, the monitoring guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists should be followed (including using 2 independent "front-line" ventilation monitors), and the crisis management algorithm presented elsewhere in this symposium 4 should be invoked when an unexplained problem occurs. In this respect careful checking of vaporizers, all connections and all ancillary equipment is vital. If in doubt the anaesthetic machine and any suspect equipment should be disconnected from the patient and discarded. Specific consideration should be given to the possibility of malfunction of any drug delivery device (including vaporizers), and of overheating blood warmers, humidifiers, blankets and light sources. Preoperative checking should include the self-inflating bag, an independent oxygen source and the availability of three spare laryngoscopes (one immediately available and two on an emergency trolley). A battery-operated torch should be available in each patient area in the theatre suite.
Thus, regular servicing of heating devices, the availability of spare layrngoscopes and a self-inflating Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, /993 bag, and meticulous adherence to the checking and monitoring guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists, should protect the patient from life-threatening equipment failure in virtually all cases except those of electric shock and power failure. The consequences of the latter may be minimized by the availability of a battery-powered torch; any consequences of the former would have to be managed by the ever-resourceful anaesthetist, assuming that he or she has not been the victim. The problem of what to do when this indispensable piece of theatre equipment is rendered unconscious or suffers ventricular fibrillation has been raised elsewhere;" one can only hope that any surgeon present will have retained the resuscitation skills learnt during a rotation through anaesthesia at an earlier stage of his or her career.
